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1For decades, scholars criticized the United States Food and Drug Administration for
delaying consumers’ access to vital new drug therapies. They argued that the FDA reg-
ulated system of drug development and approval was born out of disaster and therefore
extremely overcautious. Critics alleged that pharmaceuticals available in other indus-
trialized nations began saving lives years before the FDA would allow them onto the
American market. “Drug Lag” as it came to be known, was blamed for killing thou-
sands of Americans needlessly. In response, Congress passed The Prescription Drug
User Fee Act of 1992. The act allowed the FDA to charge user fees to drug companies
in order to generate a new inﬂux of cash that would allow for faster approval of new
pharmaceuticals. The legislation enumerated very speciﬁc new goals for the agency to
meet in its review of various submissions. The legislation also required that the FDA
submit an annual report to Congress outlining the agency’s progress in meeting the goals.
The reports reveal that the FDA has achieved staggering success. In almost every cat-
egory, the FDA met or exceeded aggressive goals outlined by Congress. Unfortunately
for Congress, the FDA, and the American consumer, this success did not end drug lag.
The time and money required to develop a new drug has ballooned dramatically. This
occurred because Congress and the FDA crafted a statute that only deals with a small
part of the problem. At its core, drug lag involves the amount of time and money re-
quired to take a drug from laboratory creation to store shelves. Since the drafters of the
PDUFA did not fully address this problem, the legislation cannot solve it.
Prior to the 20th Century, American society generally left the regulation of the quality of foods and drugs to
market forces. However, beginning in 1906, a series of disasters and near-disasters led Congress to continually
expand the power of the agency that would become the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). The world
famous thalidomide disaster convinced Congress to give the FDA vast authority to ensure drug safety and
eﬃcacy. Within ﬁfteen years, critics of the new system emerged, arguing that the requirements created
unnecessary delay and expense for companies developing critical new drug therapies. They also maintained
that this “drug lag” was quietly killing thousands of Americans who never realized that the FDA’s processes
had hindered potentially life-saving pharmaceuticals.
For years, drug lag was largely an academic debate between those intimately involved with and interested in
pharmaceutical regulation. The AIDS crisis changed that. AIDS victims mobilized into a formidable political
force that heavily focused on the FDA’s slow and expensive drug approval process. They and victims of
other life-threatening diseases ﬁnally brought drug lag into the public’s consciousness. Eventually Congress
2responded with the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (“PDUFA”) (P.L. 102-571). The principal
feature of the Act is a provision that allows the FDA to charge a “user fee” to private companies submitting
a new drug application. The FDA used the fees to hire more staﬀ members to review new drug applications
(“NDAs”) and therefore expedite the review process. Letters accompanying the legislation created speciﬁc
numerical goals for the agency to achieve. They usually require the FDA to review submissions within a
speciﬁed time frame. Each renewal of the legislation, in 1997 and 2002, led to additional and more aggressive
goals. The Act requires the FDA to submit an annual report detailing whether or not the FDA has achieved
the enumerated goals.
A thorough review of these reports reveals that the FDA has succeeded. The FDA has met or exceeded a
surprising number of aggressive goals. This success highlights a fundamental failure of the PDUFA, however.
From 1992 to the present, Congress and the FDA have failed to address the multiple aspects of the drug
lag issue. The academic literature reveals that drug lag involves at least four interconnected issues that
are not always explicitly separated. First, drug lag involves the allegation that foreign consumers receive
faster access to new drugs. Secondly, many maintain that the excessive amount of clinical study required for
NDA approval hinders drug development. Drug lag also involves the speed (or lack thereof) with which the
FDA reviews new drug applications. Finally, the term drug lag represents the concern that, everything else
aside, the entire process takes too long and people therefore die needlessly. These ideas are not mutually
exclusive, but for years the FDA has treated them as if they are. The agency has focused on speed of NDA
review and foreign versus U.S. drug access. Only recently has the FDA made any eﬀorts to improve its
own performance during clinical trials. The result has been only limited success in shortening the length of
clinical development despite overwhelming success in achieving PDUFA goals. Given that drug development
3currently costs $800 million spent over 10-15 years1, it is also clear that Congress’ and the FDA’s myopic
vision resulted in a statute that utterly failed to eﬃciently deliver inexpensive pharmaceuticals to the public.
Part I of this paper discusses the history of FDA regulation and the series of incidents that led to the current
regulatory scheme. Part II describes the process of drug approval in the United States from discovery of a
new compound to ﬁnal marketing approval. Part III introduces the drug lag issue and some of the steps
that the FDA has taken to address these concerns. Part IV takes an in-depth look at the required PDUFA
reports and compares the FDA’s performance with the goals laid out by Congress. Part V looks at some
of the research on drug development since the PDUFA was passed. Part VI suggests modiﬁcations to the
American drug approval system that might address some of the aspects of drug lag that the FDA has been
reluctant to recognize. Finally, Part VII brieﬂy concludes the paper.
Part I: The History
Prior to the 20th Century, almost none of the modern regulatory system existed in the United States. In
1820, the ﬁrst U.S. pharmacopoeia, a compilation of drugs and medicinal preparations, was established.2
Much of the other 19th Century regulation outlawed misbranding and adulteration.3 The government could
only remove misbranded or adulterated goods from the market, no pre-market review mechanism existed.4
1Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Backgrounder: How New Drugs Move through the Development and
Approval Process. November 1, 2001, available at http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=4.
2Stephen Ceccoli, The Politics of New Drug Approvals in the United States and Great Britain 102 (UMI
Dissertation Services 1998).
3Henry Miller, M.D., To America’s Health: A Proposal to Reform the Food and Drug Administration 12 (Hoover
Institution Press 2000).
4Id.
4Concerns about defective foods and drugs led to the creation of the Bureau of Chemistry in the Department
of Agriculture in 1862.5 Through a series of name changes and movements through departments, this
eventually became the current FDA located in the Department of Health and Human Services.6
Numerous disasters provided the impetus to create the current regulatory regime. The ﬁrst tragedy occurred
in Camden, New Jersey in 1901. Several children died when a diphtheria vaccination became contaminated
with tetanus.7 In response, Congress passed the Biologics Act of 1902, giving a FDA precursor the power of
pre-market approval for all biological drugs (these include “blood and blood products, vaccines, derivatives
of natural substances for treating allergies, and extracts of living cells”).8
Public concern over the safety of foods and drugs only heightened during the ﬁrst decade of the 20th Century.
In 1906, Upton Sinclair published his famous book, The Jungle, that chronicled the horribly unsanitary
conditions prevalent in the meat packing industry. In the same year, Congress passed the Meat Inspection
Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act.9 While primarily concerned with food, the Pure Food and Drug
Act also dealt with drug safety and fraud. Charlatans frequently sold consumers of the day “impure drug
substances and fake medical preparations.”10 To counter this, Congress granted the FDA the power to seize
adulterated and/or misbranded products.11
The state of drug regulation remained relatively static for three decades until the elixir sulfanimide tragedy
prompted another increase in governmental authority. Sulfanimide was one of the ﬁrst highly eﬀective drugs
to emerge from a laboratory.12 It served as a critical anti-infection agent in an era before the widespread
5Ceccoli, supra note 2 at 102.
6Id.
7Miller, supra note 3 at 11.
8Id.
9Ceccoli, supra note 2 at 102.
10Id.
11Id.
12Mark Mathieu ed., New Drug Development: A Regulatory Overview 129 (OMEC International 1987).
5use of antibiotics.13 Consumers traditionally ingested the drug in tablet form, but in the late 1930’s, the
Massengill Company decided to create and market a liquid form of the drug. To create the liquid, pharmacists
used a substance called diethylene glycol.14 This chemical compound, which today is commonly found in
automobile antifreeze, had often been used as a solvent for sulfa.15 Diethylene glycol has “a slightly sweet
taste and a pleasant pink color” which belies the fact that it is quite poisonous.16 Over 100 people, many of
them children, died after ingesting the “elixir sulfanimide.”17 Even the most basic toxicity tests would have
exposed the problem but such tests were not required at the time.18
In response to this tragedy, Congress passed the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938. This legislation still
forms the foundation of much of the FDA’s current duties. The Act radically changed the law in a number
of ways: 1) cosmetics and certain types of medical devices were brought under FDA jurisdiction; 2) the act
prohibited false advertising of food, drugs, and cosmetics; 3) ‘added poisons’ in foods were either prohibited
or subjected to tolerance levels; and 4) the act required factories to operate under federal permits where
pubic health could not be preserved by other means.19 Most signiﬁcantly, the Act required those who wished
to sell a new drug to submit an application to the FDA.20 This was the ﬁrst time that Congress gave the
FDA sweeping pre-marketing power over drug manufacturers. The FD&C Act required drug companies to
submit an application establishing the proposed use of the drug and safety at the proposed dose.21 The Act
gave the FDA 60 days to decide if the drug was safe or unsafe. If the agency failed to act during this period,
the drug proceeded to the market.22
13Id.
14Ceccoli, supra note 2 at 104.
15Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States: Drug Lag and Orphan Drugs, Journal
of Legal Medicine, December 1993, at 619.
16OMEC, supra note 12 at 129.
17Henry, supra note 15 at 619.




21Miller, supra note 3 at 13.
22Id.
6From 1938 to 1962, Congress amended the FD&C Act and passed other relatively minor food and drug
legislation. Major change would not occur until disaster struck again in the form of thalidomide. This
ﬁnal disaster spurred Congress to create the regulatory framework that is basically still in place today. In
1958, doctors in Europe began prescribing thalidomide, a drug originally developed in Germany, as a mild
sedative agent.23 Its primary use was to ease the “morning sickness” symptoms that many pregnant women
experience. Unfortunately, the drug caused terrible birth defects in as many as 10,000 children. Many were
born with severely deformed limbs, ﬂipper type appendages where arms or legs should have been, or with
limbs missing completely.24 Dr. Frances Kelsey, a FDA employee, delayed thalidomide’s approval in the
United States and the birth defects became apparent before the drug reached the U.S. market.25
Despite avoiding tragedy, Congress was suﬃciently frightened to pass the Kefauver-Harris Amendments
to the FD&C Act which radically altered the drug approval process. The amendments abolished the prior
regime of default approval. Drug companies seeking to market a new drug must still apply with the FDA, but
an aﬃrmative action by the agency is now required prior to marketing.26 Additionally, the FDA now requires
that a drug sponsor prove both safety and eﬀectiveness.27 The amendments also create good manufacturing
practices (“GMP”) standards that must be met to call a drug unadulterated, create requirements that clinical
subjects give informed consent and report adverse reactions, and give the FDA jurisdiction over prescription
23Rita Ricardo Campbell, Drug Lag: Federal Government Decision Making 5 (Hoover Institution Press 1976).
24March of Dimes, Quick Reference and Fact Sheets: Thalidomide. November 1998, available at
http://www.marchofdimes.com.
25Campbell, supra note 23 at 5.
26Miller, supra note 3 at 15.
27Hutt, supra note 18 at 477.
7drug advertising.28
Part II: The United States Drug Approval Regime
A. Pre-Clinical Phase
With a brief history complete, one can now begin to understand the American drug approval system. But to
understand how drug lag became the topic of newspaper stories, one needs to see how the post-1962 system
functions. The ﬁrst step a drug company must take is to select a compound that may have a therapeutic
eﬀect for one or more illnesses. The company can create a completely new substance in a laboratory,
a new chemical entity (NCE), or use a pre-existing substance.29 Often company scientists will screen a
variety of new compounds in animals (usually rats or mice) in hopes that some sort of eﬀect will manifest
itself.30 Another approach is to “develop a disease model in animals that resembles the disease process in
man, and then screen compounds in this model.”31 Unfortunately, this method can be very expensive and
laboratory results in animals often don’t transfer to humans. Additionally, many human diseases lack animal
counterparts that could provide the basis for this kind of research.32
Once a substance is chosen, the FDA requires rather rigorous testing on laboratory animals before human
testing (i.e. clinical testing) can begin. Drug companies often conduct two kinds of preclinical studies,
28OMEC, supra note 12 at 133.
29Id. at 12.
30Richard A. Guarino ed., New Drug Approval Process 5 (Marcel Dekker 1993).
31Id.
32Id.
8pharmacology studies and toxicity studies. Pharmacology studies isolate a compound and determine how it
interacts with the physiology of the test animal. This includes information about absorption, distribution,
metabolism and excretion.33 Drug sponsors also conduct toxicity studies of several types. Acute toxicity
testing determines the short-term eﬀects of high exposure to a drug. Often this sort of testing will include
a determination of the lethal dose. The FDA requires that the scientists observe motor function, excretion,
respiration, and behavioral problems in addition to lethality. Subacute toxicity testing is similar but requires
a long-term look at the eﬀects of the drug on the laboratory animals. These tests usually range in length
from one to three months. Finally, chronic toxicity testing looks for similar problems over an even longer
period of time. These tests can last from one to two years.34
B. Clinical Phase
The next stage in drug development begins the process of testing the compound in human subjects. The
drug sponsor must compile and organize all the data from the tests discussed above. The sponsor then
presents the information to the FDA in a ﬁling called a Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a
New Drug (“IND”).35 This is an application to the FDA asking permission to send the drug in interstate
commerce.36 The FDA has 30 days to grant or deny the IND application. If the FDA takes no action within
30 days, the sponsor can proceed to clinical testing.37 In making its decision, the FDA generally considers
33OMEC, supra note 12 at 22-23.
34Id. at 24-25.
35Guarino, supra note 30 at 39.
36Id.
37Hutt, supra note 18 at 515.
9“the protection of the human research subject,” “the adequacy of animal studies already completed and
analyzed,” “the scientiﬁc merits of the research plan,” and “the qualiﬁcations of the investigator.”38
After approval of an IND, most drug companies do not attempt to perform clinical testing on their own. The
drug companies will submit information from pre-clinical testing to institutional review boards (“IRB”) of
medical schools and independent testing entities.39 The company must convince an IRB that their product
is safe and worthy of testing in humans.40 Prior to 1981, IRB clearance only applied to trials conducted at
hospitals or universities, but the requirement now applies to all trials including those performed by private
practitioners.41 The IRB principally determines whether or not the proposed clinical trials take adequate
measures to assure patient safety. A second, related goal is assuring that the beneﬁt to risk ratio suggests
that exposing patients to the potential side eﬀects of the drug is wise.42 While any IRB is free to reject a
proposed set of clinical trials, a sponsor may approach diﬀerent IRBs until one agrees to sanction the study.
The sponsor is also free to alter the study according to suggestions by an IRB.
Once the drug maker receives FDA approval (or lack of protest) and satisﬁes an Institutional Review Board,
clinical trials may begin. FDA regulations prescribe that clinical investigation must occur in three phases.43
Phase I begins the process with the drug’s ﬁrst introduction into a human being. These trials usually start
with a single healthy volunteer receiving a single dose of the drug.44 Often this initial dose is very low, even
well below that required to cause the desired eﬀects. Over time, as safety is shown, researchers gradually
38Id.




4321 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2003).
44Hutt, supra note 18 at 516.
10increase the dosage. The researchers closely monitor the patient for side eﬀects and record how the patient
metabolizes and excretes the drug.45 Assuming no problems occur, the researchers carefully expand the
number of people taking the drug to 20-80.46 Generally, early Phase I subjects are healthy volunteers with
ﬂexible schedules that allow for easy monitoring. Sometimes, however, researchers allow hospitalized patients
with a mild form of an illness to participate.47 During Phase I, along with all the other stages, if signiﬁcant
problems are discovered the drug can be completely abandoned.
Phase II testing shifts the focus away from safety and towards the eﬃcacy of the new drug.48 For the ﬁrst
time, many of the participants will be victims of the condition that the drug seeks to treat.49 Approximately
100-200 people will participate in a Phase II study.50 The researchers closely monitor the patients for side
eﬀects since a relatively small number of humans have used the drug at this stage. Researchers will also
devise a protocol to determine whether or not the drug is eﬀective. The protocol will vary for every drug and
every condition that a drug seeks to treat. For example, “the eﬃcacy of a new cancer agent...will probably
be determined by measuring the size of malignant tumors before, during, and after drug treatments.”51
At the end of Phase II, the drug sponsor is entitled to a conference with the FDA.52 A drug’s classiﬁcation
usually dictates how soon this meeting occurs. Conferences are generally easier to arrange for drugs that
‘constitute an important therapeutic gain’ or have important toxicity problems.53 This is not a trivial
matter since the FDA generally dislikes pauses between the clinical phases.54 Once the sponsor obtains a
meeting time, it must gather a considerable amount of information. The FDA will generally want to see:
45Id.
46OMEC, supra note 12 at 68.
47Id.
48Id. at 71.
49Hutt, supra note 18 at 516.
50OMEC, supra note 12 at 71.
51Id. at 72.
52Guarino, supra note 30 at 162.
53Id. at 162, 168.
54Id. at 165.
111) tables documenting the number of patients and how many actually completed the trial, 2) explanations
for why certain patients were lost or withdrew from the study, 3) a summary of measurements taken to
determine both safety and eﬀectiveness, and 4) a statement describing whether the data has been subjected
to statistical analysis, and if so, a “justiﬁcation of the adequacy of such analysis.”55 During the conference
a FDA employee will examine the data and discuss any inadequacies or problems that the sponsor needs to
address. The meeting is also an opportunity to reach an agreement on an acceptable Phase III protocol.56
The ﬁnal clinical studies occur during Phase III where hundreds or even thousands of patients receive the
experimental new drug.57 The setting should approximate that in which patients would use the drug if
approved by the FDA.58 These larger studies allow researchers to identify side eﬀects that the smaller
trials did not detect and help establish a ﬁnal correct dosage.59 Phase III studies are often monitored less
closely than Phase I or II studies and many of the participants will be outpatient.60 Researchers use a control
(placebo) and experimental (new drug) group and investigate potential drug interactions.61 The FDA almost
always requires at least two Phase III studies before it will consider approving a new drug. Predictably, this
complicated and rigorous process tends to eliminate many potential new drugs. Only about 10% of IND
applicants survive the entire clinical process and warrant the ﬁling of a NDA.62
55Id. at 166.
56Id. at 167.
57Hutt, supra note 18 at 516.
58Id.
59OMEC, supra note 12 at 74.
60Id.
61Hutt, supra note 18 at 516.
62Id.
12C. New Drug Application
If a substance successfully navigates the stages outlined above and shows potential to treat a condition, the
maker submits a new drug application to the Food and Drug Administration. This is the formal request of
the drug company for the FDA to allow the marketing of the drug. NDAs can be staggering documents. The
sponsor must submit copies of practically all the data it has collected about the drug over the past years of
preclinical and clinical development.63 This includes data from every human study, every animal study, every
toxicity test, every reproduction study, and every eﬃcacy study.64 The sponsor must include both positive
and negative data about the drug to the FDA. The NDA must also detail the drug’s manufacturing process,
including how quality will be maintained.65 For some drugs this raw data plus required summary material
totals over 100,000 pages.66 The regulation of NDAs even deals in minutiae such as the type of paper that
must be used and which sections of the application must be placed in certain color-coded folders.67
Part III: Drug Lag
While AIDS advocates did increase public focus on drug lag, they did not invent the drug lag idea. By the
early 1990s, scholars had been focused on the issue for over 15 years. One of the ﬁrst scholars to discuss drug
lag was University of Chicago economist Dr. Sam Peltzman. His 1974 book, Regulation of Pharmaceutical Innovation,
is essentially a quantitative treatise against the FDA’s expanding role in drug approval. One of Peltzman’s
63Id. at 519.
64Guarino, supra note 30 at 270-83.
65Hutt, supra note 18 at 519.
66Id.
67Guarino, supra note 30 at 267-68.
13primary arguments was that the 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments had signiﬁcantly slowed the rate of new
drug development in the United States.68 He noticed that “in the decade before the amendments an average
of forty-three NCEs (new chemical entities) were introduced annually compared with an annual average of
sixteen in the (subsequent) decade.”69 Peltzman employed market growth statistics and concluded that this
was not merely a coincidental correlation. “The 1962 amendments have been responsible for substantially all
the post-1962 decline in drug innovation.”70 Peltzman also determined that, as of 1974, the new eﬃcacy and
clinical trial requirements were adding at least two years to the time required to produce and market a new
drug.71 In 1962, the FDA approved the average NDA in seven months, but by 1967, with new requirements
to review voluminous eﬃcacy data for every drug, average review time had skyrocketed to 30 months.72
Dr. Peltzman continued to ﬁnd other problems with the post-1962 approval mechanism. One of the goals
of the Kefauver-Harris amendments was to reduce the amount of money consumers spend on ineﬀective
drugs.73 This was the primary impetus behind instituting the new eﬃcacy requirement for all new pharma-
ceuticals. Dr. Peltzman determined that the amendments did successfully reduce consumers’ expenditures
on ineﬀective drugs, but only by reducing consumer access to all new drugs.74 He concluded that “(t)he
incidence of ineﬀective new drugs does not appear to have been materially reduced” and “(e)ven if it had
been, the pre-1962 waste on ineﬀective new drugs that might now be prevented appears to have been too
small to compensate for the beneﬁts consumers have had to forgo because of reduced drug innovation.”75 In
68Sam Peltzman, Regulation of Pharmaceutical innovation: The 1962 Amendments 13 (American Enterprise Institute





73Ceccolli, supra note 2 at 107-9. (Senator Estes Kefauver had been concerned about excessive proﬁts generated by the drug
industry for many years before the 1962 amendments. During the 1950s he initiated hearings on drug pricing and eﬃcacy and
even submitted a bill to the Senate. Senator Kefauver made little progress on the issue, or the legislation, until the thalidomide
tragedy.)
74Peltzman, supra note 81 at 48.
75Id.
14total, Dr. Peltzman’s ﬁgures showed that the Kefauver-Harris amendments had cost American consumers
approximately $250 million.76 The reduced ﬂow of new drugs caused by regulatory delay cost consumers
$300-400 million, higher prices for drugs due to lack of competition from delayed new drugs cost consumers
$50 million, and the beneﬁt of reduced purchases on ineﬀective new drugs only saved consumers $100 mil-
lion.77
Other scholars have seriously questioned the economic and practical beneﬁts of the FDA’s system. Many
drugs that were approved in Europe and began saving lives were delayed considerably in the United States.
For instance, “in 1978, W.M. Wardell estimated that Practolol, a drug in the beta-blocking family, could save
10,000 lives per year if allowed in the United States...The agency’s withholding of beta blockers alone was
responsible for probably tens of thousands of deaths.”78 Other researchers have compared the incidence of
drug disasters in the U.S. and foreign nations. One researcher estimates that “the beneﬁts of FDA regulation
relative to that in foreign countries could reasonably be put at some 5,000 casualties per decade or 10,000
per decade for worst case scenarios. In comparison...the cost of FDA delay can be estimated at anywhere
from 21,000 to 120,000 lives per decade.”79
The AIDS crisis ﬁnally brought the drug lag issue out of academia and into the consciousness of the general
populace. Acquired Immune Deﬁciency Syndrome was ﬁrst discovered as an independent disease in 1979.80
Two years later, doctors diagnosed the ﬁrst case in the United States. Once the deadly disease gained a
foothold, it spread extremely quickly. “The ﬁrst 50,000 cases of AIDS were reported to CDC from 1981 to
1987; the second 50,000 were reported between December 1987 and July 1989.”81 Drug companies developed
therapies for the disease, but many in the AIDS-victim community argued that the FDA approval regime
76Id. at 81.
77Id.
78Daniel B. Klein, Time to end America’s Drug Lag, Consumers Research Magazine, April 1, 2002, at 3.
79Id.
80Hutt, supra note 18 at 552.
81Id.
15hindered this process. They argued that it is illogical to delay a drug for years to carefully test for safety
and eﬃcacy when the target population of that drug is already assured death.
In the late 1980’s, the FDA began to relent and made a variety of changes and special exceptions to the
drug approval system. In 1987, the FDA changed its rules to allow “treatment INDs.”82 This program
allows doctors to prescribe drugs still in the IND phase of development to terminally ill patients for whom
comparable alternative treatments do not exist.83 A treatment IND generally allows physicians to prescribe
a medicine between Phases II and III, when research suggests that the drug may have some eﬃcacy and
does not pose an unreasonable health risk.84 The agency has even allowed emergency INDs that allow a
doctor to obtain permission over the phone to use an unapproved drug to treat a patient in dire need.85
Many activists remained unsatisﬁed, however. They argued that the FDA was reluctant to allow new drugs
into the treatment IND program and too strict in deciding which situations are life-threatening enough to
warrant the use of an experimental drug.86
As a direct result of the AIDS crisis, the FDA started a fast track approval program in 1987.87 This pro-
gram rapidly accelerates the stages of drug development discussed in the previous section. Prior to ‘fast
track,’ many AIDS victims participated in “underground” trials of the drugs that were only available in
foreign countries. Not only were the side eﬀects potentially life-threatening, but the surreptitious trials also
“seriously threaten(ed) the FDA’s legitimate clinical trials by undercutting the validity of FDA research
data.”88 Many patients were unwilling to risk receiving a placebo in the FDA approved studies and would
use the ‘underground’ drug concurrently.89 The fast track procedure applies to drugs that will treat “life-
8221 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2003). See also Vivian I Orlando, The FDA’s Accelerated Approval Process: Does the Pharmaceutical
Industry Have Adequate Incentives for Self-Regulation?, 25 Am. J.L. & Med. 543, 546 (1999).
83Myron Marlin, Treatment INDs: A Faster Route To Drug Approval?, 39 Am. U.L. Rev. 171, 185 (1989).
84Julie C. Relihan, Expediting FDA Approval of AIDS Drugs: An International Approach, 13 B.U. Int’l L.J. 229, 234 (1995).
85Hutt, supra note 18 at 553.
86Id.
87Mary T. Griﬃn, AIDS Drugs & the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need for Reform, 17 Am. J.L. & Med. 363, 379 (1991).
88Relihan, supra note 84 at 236.
89Id.
16threatening” or “severely debilitating” diseases. Life-threatening “is deﬁned to include diseases where the
likelihood of death is high unless the course of the disease is interrupted (e.g. AIDS and cancer) as well
as diseases and conditions with potentially fatal outcomes where the end point of clinical trial analysis is
survival (e.g. increased survival in persons who have had a stroke or heart attack).”90
Probably the most important aspect of the fast track mechanism is the cooperation between the FDA and
the manufacturer. In the development of the AIDS drug AZT, for example, the FDA worked closely with
sponsor Burroughs-Wellcome to develop the preclinical and human trials.91 In this case the government even
took the drastic step of combining Phase II and III trials.92 With a record-setting NDA review time of 3.5
months, the total process, which at that time averaged 8 years, took only 2 years for AZT.93 In addition
to expedited clinical and review phases, the fast track procedure also allows a sponsor to forego a control
group, thereby eliminating the chance that a very sick patient will receive a placebo.94
The FDA also attempted to facilitate pharmaceutical development through the Orphan Drug Act. An orphan
drug “is a potentially useful drug that has not been adopted by a sponsor to carry out the testing necessary
to gain Food and Drug Administration approval...because of (it’s) limited marketability, commercial value,
and/or potential liability.”95 The most common problem is limited commercial value due to a small patient
population. In fact, many orphan drugs are not discovered through purposeful research but by accident.96
Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act in 1983.97 The most important provision of the Act grants the spon-
sor of the orphan drug seven-year market exclusivity.98 This helps the sponsor defray the costs of developing
a drug that will only appeal to a limited number of consumers. Patent protection is often not suﬃcient since
90Hutt, supra note 18 at 560.
91Griﬃn, supra note 87 at 381.
92Id.
93Hutt, supra note 18 at 561.
94Relihan, supra note 84 at 236.
95Henry, supra note 15 at 628-9.
96Id. at 629.
9796 Stat. 2049 (1983).
98Id. at 630.
17it can expire soon after or even before the FDA approves a drug.99 The Act also gives certain tax credits
to sponsors of these drugs and allows the secretary of Health and Human Services to make grants to private
and public organizations willing to develop these drugs.100
Part IV: The PDUFA Goals and FDA Performance
A. Background on the Act
The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 created the biggest and most important changes at the FDA over
the past generation. The legislation permits the FDA to charge a fee to a drug sponsor who submits a new
drug application. The fees allowed the FDA to increase its NDA review staﬀ by 50%.101 Congress hoped that
with more staﬀ the agency could approve NDAs faster and therefore reduce the drug lag problem. Before
passage, average NDA approval times had ballooned to over two years, even though the Kefauver-Harris
amendments had envisioned that NDA review would require only 180 days.102
The user fee concept was not new when Congress ﬁrst authorized the PDUFA in 1992. The Independent
Oﬃces Appropriation Act of 1952 allowed the FDA to charge user fees to sponsors seeking color and insulin
certiﬁcation.103 By 1971, the General Accounting Oﬃce recommended that Congress pass legislation to
allow the FDA to impose user fees on all companies under the agency’s authority. The proposal was largely
99Id. at 631.
100Id.
101Dan Kidd, The International Conference on Harmonization of Pharmaceutical Regulations, the European Medicines Eval-
uation Agency, and the FDA: Who’s Zooming Who?, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Fall 1996, at 198.
102Id.
103Sheila Shulman & Kenneth Kaitin, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992: A 5-Year Experiment for Industry and
the FDA, PharmacoEconomics, February 1996, at 123.
18ignored and the issue did not receive more attention for ﬁfteen years.104
The issue of user fees resurfaced during the Reagan administration. The FDA’s workload continued to in-
crease in volume and complexity and agency performance was beginning to suﬀer due to lack of resources.
The FDA suggested a system of user fees for all new drugs and antibiotics. The administration showed
only lukewarm interest in this proposal. Five million dollars worth of user fees were appropriated in the
1985 and 1986 budgets, but this came directly out of the agency’s normal appropriations, i.e. the FDA
operating budget did not increase.105 During the early 90’s, considerable support ﬁnally aligned behind ex-
panded implementation of user fees. In addition to pressure to expedite the NDA approval process, several
other conditions encouraged this development: “a) the long-standing resource constraints on the agency had
become critical, b) between 1980 and 1991 Congress had enacted 34 laws that placed additional resource
demands on the agency, c) during the same period the annual number of (IND) ﬁlings increased from 66
to 504, and d) FDA projections put the number at over 3000 by 1998, and the federal government’s deﬁcit
problems made the prospect of increased FDA appropriations highly unlikely.”106
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (“PMA”) insisted upon four primary features that Congress
incorporated into the statute. The money from the user fees must be added to existing FDA appropriations,
not subtracted from them. The fees must be reasonable, predictable, and used directly to expedite the drug
approval process. Finally, the PMA insisted that the system improvements be long term in nature. The
resulting legislation created a system that required sponsors of prescription and over the counter drugs to
pay a certain amount of money to obtain NDA review. Blood products and generic drugs are not subject to
user fee legislation.107 The amount of the user fee is set by regulation and is currently $313,320.108 Half of





108Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 2223 (Jan. 16, 2002).
19approvable letter (i.e. a letter detailing an application’s deﬁciencies and remedial measures required), or a
nonapprovable letter.109
Before Congress passed the PDUFA, many critics argued that user fees would stiﬂe pharmaceutical innova-
tion. To address these concerns the legislation uses two tactics. First, the FDA can reduce or even waive
a user fee under certain circumstances.110 The circumstances include: when the fee will inhibit the devel-
opment of an important drug for public health, when the amount of the fee will be greater than the FDA’s
reviewing expenses, when the drug is substantially similar to a generic drug for which no user fees were
required, or when the application is withdrawn before any signiﬁcant work is completed on it. Secondly,
small drug companies may be eligible for a reduced fee provision. Pharmaceutical sponsors with less than
500 employees can receive a 50% reduction in the fee and a one-year deferral before payment is due.111 The
FDA granted four small business reductions during the ﬁrst two years of the PDUFA112
B. Report Data
Each version of the PDUFA was accompanied by a letter outlining speciﬁc numerical goals for the FDA to
meet. Congress developed these benchmarks to allow it and the public to accurately evaluate the user fee
program. Although never stated explicitly, the accomplishment of these goals (many of them quite aggres-
sive considering FDA performance in the years leading up to the Act) was to signal the end of the drug lag
problem.
The goals center around four main areas. The ﬁrst category is new drug applications, including product and




20equipment license applications (“PLAs” and “ELAs”). The second category concerns the quick handling
of eﬃcacy supplements to new drug applications. Eﬃcacy supplements are submissions to the FDA asking
permission for new dosage regimens, new claims of eﬃcacy vis a vis a competitive drug, or some sort of
change in the patient/consumer population, such as changing the drug to over the counter.113 The third
major category involves the manufacturing supplements that the FDA requires when a drug company wants
to alter a drug’s production process. This could entail a change in raw materials, manufacturing plant lo-
cation, or machinery used in production.114 The ﬁnal major category tracks the FDA’s progress in quickly
reviewing resubmitted NDAs, PLAs and ELAs. As the name suggests, these are applications that were
submitted once and withdrawn after the FDA noticed problems or requested additional data. If the sponsor
can resolve the problems, they will amend the application and resubmit it to the agency.
The PDUFA also required the FDA to meet certain secondary goals and collect certain information for later
review. In the 1997 reauthorization, Congress required the agency to schedule meetings with drug companies
and distribute minutes of those meetings in a timely fashion. At the passage of the PDUFA, the FDA had
accumulated a large backlog of NDAs and eﬃcacy/manufacturing supplements. The legislation required the
agency to eliminate this backlog within a speciﬁc time frame. The Act also required the FDA to hire the
additional staﬀ that the user fees would fund by a certain date. Finally, the user fee act forced the FDA to
track its workload, the amount of money that user fees generated, and how that money was being allocated.
The FDA must send annual reports to Congress that address all of the issues discussed above. A compre-
hensive review of these reports shows that the FDA has achieved staggering success. As the summaries and
tables below indicate, the FDA met almost every goal laid out by Congress. In some cases, FDA performance
ran years ahead of schedule. In most areas workload increased in the early years of the act but leveled oﬀ
113Department of Health and Human Services, Application to Market a New Drug, Biologic, or an Antibiotic Drug for Human
Use, September 2002, available at http://forms.psc.gov/forms/MSWFDA/FDA-356h.doc.
114Center For Drug Evaluation and Research, Report to the Nation: 1999, March 8, 2001, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/rtn99-2.htm.
21as the years progressed towards the present. The ultimate result is that since the beginning of the user fee
program the average time for NDA approval has decreased from 27 months to about 12.5 months.115
New Drug Applications
Starting in ﬁscal year (FY) 1994, Congress devised speciﬁc goals for the completion of original new drug
applications.116 During FY1994, Congress required the FDA to review and act upon 55 percent of NDAs
within 12 months. By comparison, in 1987 average NDA approval time was 29 months.117 In FY95 the goal
was increased to 70% of NDAs acted upon within 12 months and by FY96 that number went to 80%.
As Table 1.1 illustrates, the FDA performed extremely well. As of Sept. 30, 1995, the FDA had acted upon
93% percent of all NDAs from FY94 within the 12-month time frame. The report for FY95 shows that 95%
of all submissions were reviewed within 12 months when the goal was only 70%. The following year FDA
performance stayed ahead of schedule with 96% of NDAs completed on time, well over the goal of 80%.
Table 1.1 NDA Goals and Review Times for FY94-96118
115United States Food and Drug Administration, New Drug Approval Time: The Facts, February 22, 2002, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/thefacts/questions.html#question3.
116Although the term new drug application is used, the numbers discussed in the text and used in the tables reﬂect FDA
performance on NDAs, PLAs, and ELAs combined.
117FDA Third Annual Performance Report: Prescription Drug User Fee Act at 2 (1995). (available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/pdufa/default.htm).
118This table, in addition to the ones involving eﬃcacy supplements, manufacturing supplements, resubmissions, and workload,
contain data complied from the FDA Annual Performance Reports to Congress from years 1995-2001. The reports themselves
generally contain complete data for only a couple of years, i.e. the latest report does not summarize FDA performance over the
entire period that the PDUFA has been in eﬀect. The reports are available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/pdufa/default.htm.
22Goal Actual Performance
FY94 55% within 12 months 93% within 12 months
FY95 70% within 12 months 95% within 12 months
FY96 80% within 12 months 96% within 12 months
Beginning in FY97, the goals outlined by Congress divide according to normal and priority new drug ap-
plications. For 1997, the FDA goal for normal NDAs reviewed within 12 months increased again to 90%.
For priority NDAs Congress set the goal at 90% within 6 months. This goal for priority NDAs remained
constant for the remaining ﬁscal years up to the present. For regular NDAs however, Congress continued
to raise the bar. For FY99, the 90% within 12 months goal remained, but Congress also required the FDA
to review and act upon 30% of applications within only 10 months. In FY2000, the goal increased to 50%
within 10 months, in FY2001 70% within 10 months, and in FY2002 90% within 10 months.
Once again, the FDA accomplished the goals created by Congress. Table 1.2 shows that 100% of standard
applications were completed within 12 months during ﬁscal year 1997. The FDA achieved similar success
with priority applications during FY97 with 96% reviewed on time. This number might have climbed to
100%, but the reports are unclear on the resolution of two applications. During ﬁscal year 1998, the FDA
completed the review of all 120 standard and priority NDAs within the time frame required by the act. For
FY99, all 31 priority applications were acted upon within the 6 month window. The FDA also reviewed all
94 standard applications within 12 months. Sixty-eight percent of standard applications were acted upon
within 10 months. Finally, in ﬁscal year 2000, the FDA reviewed 97% of priority applications within 6
months. For standard applications, 97% were acted upon within the 12 month goal and 81% were acted
upon within the 10 month goal. This is well ahead of the goal which required only 50% during FY00.
23Table 1.2 NDA Goals and Review Times for FY97-00
Goal Actual Performance
FY97 standard 90% within 12 months 100% within 12 months
priority 90% within 6 months 96% within 6 months
FY98 standard 90% within 12 months 100% within 12 months
priority 90% within 6 months 100% within 6 months
FY99 standard 90% within 12 months 100% within 12 months
30% within 10 months 68% within 10 months
priority 90% within 6 months 100% within 6 months
FY00 standard 90% within 12 months 97% within 12 months
50% within 10 months 81% within 10 months
priority 90% within 6 months 97% within 6 months
Eﬃcacy Supplements
In FY94, Congress required the FDA to review and act upon 55% of eﬃcacy supplements within 12 months
of submission. For FY95, the PDUFA increases this goal to 70% and for FY96 to 80%. Once again, the
FDA outstripped the stated goals considerably. In FY94, 73% of eﬃcacy supplements were reviewed and
acted upon within the 12 month time frame. For FY95, the FDA completed 93% of eﬃcacy supplements
24within 12 months. Finally, in FY96, 96% of eﬃcacy supplements were acted upon within 12 months, well
above the goal of 80%.
Table 2.1 Eﬃcacy Supplements Goals and Review Times for FY94-
96
Goal Actual Performance
FY94 55% within 12 months 73% within 12 months
FY95 70% within 12 months 93% within 12 months
FY96 80% within 12 months 96% within 12 months
For ﬁscal year 1997 and beyond, the goals for eﬃcacy supplements divide according to standard and priority
submissions. For FY97 itself, the PDUFA requires that the FDA review and act upon 90% of priority
eﬃcacy supplements within 6 months and 90% of standard supplements within 12 months. For priority
supplements this goal (90% within 6 months) remains static through 2002. For standard supplements, the
PDUFA steadily makes the standard more aggressive. For FY99, 90% had to be acted upon in 12 months
and 30% within 10 months of receipt. In FY00, the act requires 50% completion within 10 months and
90% completion within a year. The goal is raised to 70% within 10 months in FY 2001, and 90% within 10
months in FY2002.
Table 2.2 illustrates the mostly successful results. In FY97, all priority supplements were reviewed on time
25and 99% of the 149 standard supplements submitted were reviewed and acted upon within 12 months. For
FY98, the FDA acted upon only 80% of priority supplements within 6 months, but it reviewed 99% of
standard supplements within the act’s guidelines. In FY99, the FDA once again fell short of its goal vis a vis
priority supplements by only completing 88% within 6 months. The FDA acted on all standard supplements
within 12 months and completed 86% within 10 months. This far exceeded the goal of 30% completed within
10 months. Finally, in FY00, the FDA improved in the priority supplement area, reviewing all 20 priority
eﬃcacy supplements within 6 months. Ninety-nine percent of standard supplements were reviewed within
12 months and 91% were reviewed within 10 months.
Table 2.2 Eﬃcacy Supplement Goals and Review Times for FY97-
00
Goal Actual Performance
FY97 standard 90% within 12 months 99% within 12 months
priority 90% within 6 months 100% within 6 months
FY98 standard 90% within 12 months 99% within 12 months
priority 90% within 6 months 80% within 6 months
FY99 standard 90% within 12 months 100% within 12 months
30% within 10 months 86% within 10 months
priority 90% within 6 months 88% within 6 months
26FY00 standard 90% within 12 months 99% within 12 months
50% within 10 months 91% within 10 months
priority 90% within 6 months 100% within 6 months
Manufacturing Supplements
The third major set of goals created for the FDA by the user fee act concerns manufacturing supplements.
For FY94, the Act set the goal at 55% of supplements reviewed and acted upon within 6 months of receipt.
The Act steadily increased the goal to 70% in FY95, 80% in FY96, and 90% for FY97 and FY98.
Table 3.1 illustrates that the FDA enjoyed considerable success in meeting these goals. During FY94, the
FDA reviewed 69% of all manufacturing supplements within the allotted six month time frame. By FY95,
performance increased to 89%, and in subsequent years the number remained over 95%. The 89% ﬁgure for
FY95 put the FDA only one percentage point shy of being two years ahead of schedule.
Table 3.1 Manufacturing Supplements Goals and Performance for
FY94-97
Goal Actual Performance
FY94 55% within 6 months 69% within 6 months
FY95 70% within 6 months 89% within 6 months
FY96 80% within 6 months 96% within 6 months
27FY97 90% within 6 months 99% within 6 months
For FY98, the goal for review and action on manufacturing supplements remained 90% within 6 months.
The goals of the act become more aggressive beginning in FY99. For that year the FDA was required to
review 90% of manufacturing supplements within six months and 30% within four months. The Act steadily
increased the goal to 50% within four months in FY00, 70% within four months in FY01, and 90% within
four months by FY02.
Once again, the FDA far exceeded the standards required of it. In ﬁscal year 1998, the FDA reviewed
and acted upon 99% of all manufacturing supplements within the six month time frame. By FY99, 98% of
all supplements were completed within 6 months and 76% within four months. This performance in 1999
exceeded the goal laid out by the act for FY01. Finally in FY00, the FDA continued its success by completing
97% of manufacturing supplements within six months and 79% within four months.
Table 3.2 Manufacturing Supplement Goals and Review Times for
FY98-00
Goal Actual Performance
FY98 90% within 6 months 99% within 6 months
FY99 90% within 6 months 98% within 6 months
30% within 4 months 76% within 4 months
28FY00 90% within 6 months 97% within 6 months
50% within 4 months 79% within 4 months
Resubmitted Applications
The ﬁnal major category of goals enunciated for the FDA in the PDUFA concerns resubmitted applications.
As mentioned previously, the FDA ﬁnds some new drug applications lacking and asks the sponsor to make
changes and resubmit later. Since the FDA has already had a chance to review the initial application, the
required review times are shorter than those discussed for NDAs. For ﬁscal year 1994, the act requires that
the FDA review 55% of resubmitted applications within 6 months. This goal increases to 70% in FY95, 80%
in FY96, and 90% for FY97.
Table 4.1 shows that the FDA achieved considerable success in meeting these goals. During FY94, the
FDA reviewed and acted upon 81% of resubmitted applications within six months and in FY95 this number
increased to 96%. Both of these achievements were over two years ahead of schedule. The ﬁgures for FY96
and FY97 were 99% within six months and 92% within six months respectively.
Table 4.1 Resubmitted Applications Goals and Performance for
FY94-97
Goal Actual Performance
29FY94 55% within 6 months 81% within 6 months
FY95 70% within 6 months 96% within 6 months
FY96 80% within 6 months 99% within 6 months
FY97 90% within 6 months 92% within 6 months
Beginning in ﬁscal year 1998, the goals for resubmitted applications became more aggressive and bifurcated
between Class 1 and Class 2 applications. Class 1 resubmitted applications are those considered more urgent
by the FDA. For FY98, the act required that 90% of all resubmitted applications be reviewed and acted
upon within six months and 30% of class 1 resubmitted applications be reviewed within 2 months. For FY99,
the act requires the FDA to complete 90% of class 2 applications within six months. It also requires the
completion of 90% of class 1 resubmitted applications within four months and 50% within 2 months. The
goal for class 2 resubmissions remains static at 90% within six months for the remainder of the statutory
period. For class 1 the goals continue to become more aggressive. In FY00, the FDA must complete 70% of
class 1 resubmissions inside two months (along with 90% within four months). In FY01 and FY02 the act
requires the FDA to complete 90% of class 1 resubmissions within two months.
Up to FY00, the FDA was meeting the aggressive goals laid out by the user fee act. In FY98, the FDA
completed 79% of class 1 resubmissions within two months and all were complete before six months had past.
All class 2 resubmissions during FY98 were reviewed and acted upon within the statutory period. During
FY99, the FDA performed extremely well, completing 100% of class 1 resubmissions within two months and
100% of class 2 submissions within six months. Finally, in FY00, the FDA acted upon all class 1 resubmitted
applications within four months and 96% within two months. Ninety-eight percent of class 2 resubmissions
30were reviewed and acted on within the statutory time frame.
Table 4.2 Resubmitted Applications Goals and Review Times for
FY98-00
Goal Actual Performance
FY98 all 90% within 6 months 100% within 6 months
Class 1 30% within 2 months 79% within 2 months
FY99 Class 1 90% within 4 months -
50% within 2 months 100% within 2 months
Class 2 90% within 6 months 100% within 6 months
FY00 Class 1 90% within 4 months 100% within 4 months
70% within 2 months 96% within 2 months
Class 2 90% within 6 months 98% within 6 months
Workload
The annual reports also contain data on the FDA’s yearly workload. Congress wanted this information in
order to accurately evaluate the FDA’s performance. The FDA met Congressional goals despite a steadily
increasing workload during the early years of the Act. As the 1990s progressed however, the agency workload
31tended to remain high yet stable. Presumably this aided the agency in achieving the very aggressive goals
required by Congress in the more recent years of the Act.
The workload pattern of new drug applications clearly illustrates this trend. The number of NDAs submitted
increased during the ﬁrst few years of the act, from 96 in FY93 to 133 by FY97. The number of submissions
then hovered between 120 and 134 during the years of 1998-2000. The preliminary data for 2001 suggests a
large drop oﬀ to only 101 new drug applications.
Table 5.1 NDA Workload During FY93-01
# of submissions Diﬀerence % increase/decrease
FY93 96 - -
FY94 98 +2 +2%
FY95 121 +23 +23%
FY96 115 -6 -5%
FY97 133 +18 +16%
32FY98 120 -13 -10%
FY99 127 +7 +6%
FY00 134 +7 +5.5%
FY01 101 -33 -25%
For eﬃcacy supplements the trend was somewhat similar, however, the workload increase was steadier and
the reduction in 2001 was small. As Table 5.2 illustrates, the number of eﬃcacy supplements hovered around
100 for the ﬁrst four years of the PDUFA. In FY97, the number of eﬃcacy supplements spiked from 113 to
162. The trend leveled oﬀ during ﬁscal years 1998 and 1999, with 138 and 145 supplements respectively.
Another big jump occurred in FY00 with the number increasing to 187. The reports indicate a projected
slight decrease to 168 for FY01.
Table 5.2 Eﬃcacy Supplement Workload during FY93-01
# of submissions Diﬀerence % increase/decrease
FY93 100 - -
FY94 93 -7 -7%
FY95 87 -6 -6%
33FY96 113 +26 +30%
FY97 162 +49 +43%
FY98 138 -24 -15%
FY99 145 +7 +5%
FY00 187 +42 +29%
FY01 168 -19 -10%
The number of manufacturing supplements refused to follow
the trends of the other three categories. The numbers steadily in-
creased from 1,248 in FY93 to 1,600 in FY97. The upward trend
continued in FY98, FY99, and FY00 with 1,834, 1,936 and 2,025
manufacturing supplements submitted to the FDA respectively.
Unlike the other categories, the number of supplements did not
decrease in FY01, rather the FDA reported a modest gain.
Table 5.3 Manufacturing Supplement Workload during FY93-01
# of submissions Diﬀerence % increase/decrease
FY93 1248 - -
34FY94 1058 -190 -15%
FY95 1519 +461 +43.5%
FY96 1479 -40 -3%
FY97 1600 +121 +8%
FY98 1834 +234 +15%
FY99 1936 +102 +5.5%
FY00 2025 +89 +4.5%
FY01 2069 +44 +2%
Finally, the number of NDA resubmissions followed the trend of upward movement and subsequent leveling
oﬀ outlined above. During FY93, the FDA only received three resubmissions. This number grew during
the next three years, increasing to 98 during FY96. In the subsequent years, the number of resubmissions
decreased and hovered between 90 in FY97 and 71 in FY98. FY2001 saw a slight decrease to 76 but, as
Table 5.4 indicates, this was not a large decrease given previous numbers.
35Table 5.4 Resubmissions Workload during FY93-01
# of submissions Diﬀerence % increase/decrease
FY93 3 - -
FY94 37 +34 +1100%
FY95 61 +24 +65%
FY96 98 +37 +61%
FY97 90 -8 -8%
FY98 71 -19 -21%
FY99 77 +6 +8%
FY00 89 +12 +15.5%
FY01 76 -13 -15%
Procedural/Processing Goals
The PDUFA created various secondary goals for the FDA to accomplish. One concerned recruitment of
new staﬀ. As discussed earlier, Congress hoped user fees would fund new drug review personnel who would
facilitate faster review of agency submissions. This necessitated hiring goals during the initial stages of
36the Act. The goal was to add approximately 700 people to the review staﬀ of the FDA at the Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research (“CBER”) and the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (“CDER”).
The eﬀect of attrition makes this task more diﬃcult, i.e. the FDA must hire many more than 700 people
to achieve a net gain of 700 people. Table 6.1 shows that as of September 30, 1995, the FDA was making
progress towards its goal. Unfortunately, subsequent reports do not mention whether the goal was ultimately
met. The silence, in addition to the FDA’s success in meeting numerical goals, might suggest that the FDA
met its hiring goals.
Table 6.1 User Fee Recruitment (10/1/92-9/30/95)
New Hires Net Additions
Medical/Dental 122 65
Chemist 60 25




Other Scientist 99 45
Support 407 102
37Total 1023 399
Another problem identiﬁed before the passage of the PDUFA was a consistent ‘backlog’ of submissions
that prevented a quick turn-around for any newly submitted items. The PDUFA goals required the FDA
to complete pre-act manufacturing and eﬃcacy supplements within 18 months of the beginning of user fee
payments. Therefore, the FDA had to review and act on 569 supplements by January 2, 1995. The agency
achieved this goal. The FDA approved 388 (68 percent) of the eﬃcacy and manufacturing supplements.
Sponsors withdrew 97 of the remaining 181 submissions.
Table 6.2 Supplement Backlog Elimination (10/1/92-1/2/95)




The Act also required the FDA to eliminate a backlog of NDAs, PLAs, ELAs and related documents. The
Act gives the FDA exactly two years, making July 2, 1995 the deadline. The FDA achieved the goal in
38all categories. Of the backlogged 34 new drug applications, the FDA approved 21, ﬁve were withdrawn,
four resubmitted, and four were classiﬁed as ‘not approvable.’ The FDA also cleared 92 backlogged PLAs,
ELAs and related supplements. Sponsors withdrew 55, the FDA approved 22, the FDA classiﬁed two as
approvable, and classiﬁed 13 as ‘not approvable.’
Table 6.3 Application Backlog Elimination (10/1/92-7/2/95)
Backlog at Passage Backlog as of 7/2/95
NDAs 34 0
PLAs/ELAs 22 0
PLA Eﬃcacy Supps. 6 0
ELA Manufacturing Supps. 64 0
Total 126 0
The Prescription Drug User Fee Act requires the FDA to submit ﬁnancial statements to Congress outlining
the amount of fees collected and how they were used. The reports show that the user fee system has
been highly eﬀective in generating millions of dollars in extra revenue for the FDA. The user fees began in
39FY1993 with the “full fee”, i.e. the fee for reviewing an NDA containing clinical data, set at $100,000.119 As
mentioned earlier, the current fee totals over three hundred thousand dollars. As Table 6.4 illustrates, the
result has been over $100 million in additional revenue for the CDER and CBER. While the table does not
make it completely clear, the FDA did not collect the expected amount of fees during FY01. This resulted
in a much lower carryover balance than usual that will endanger FDA’s continuing adherence to PDUFA
goals.
Table 6.4 User Fee Collections and Carryover Balances– FY93-01120
FY Starting Carryover Net Collections Obligations Ending Carryover
93 - 28,531,996 8,949,000 19,582,996
94 19,582,996 53,730,244 39,951,020 33,362,220
95 33,362,220 70,953,500 74,064,015 30,251,705
96 30,251,705 82,318,400 85,053,030 27,517,075
97 27,517,075 93,234,125 84,289,046 36,462,154
119Shulman, supra note 103 at 124.
120FDA FY 2001 PDUFA Financial Report at 18 (February 2002) (available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/ﬁnreport2001/ﬁnancial-fy2001.htm).
4098 36,462,154 132,671,143 101,615,000 67,518,297
99 67,518,297 126,580,456 122,515,000 71,583,753
00 71,583,753 133,060,339 147,276,000 57,369,092
01 57,368,092 138,761,294 160,713,000 35,416,386
The ﬁrst version of the PDUFA did not contain any goals related to the IND phase of drug development.
After industry complaints that the FDA was often diﬃcult to work with, the 1997 reauthorization included
some modest procedural goals aimed at facilitating the relationship between drug sponsors and the FDA.
The reauthorization required the FDA to expedite its correspondence with drug sponsors and to avoid
unnecessary delays during the clinical phase. Even though drug sponsors and independent research facilities
conduct a potential new drug’s clinical development, the FDA is often highly involved in the process. The
drug sponsor wants to develop the data the FDA wants to see in order to increase the chances of viable
NDA.
The goals in this area divide into three separate issues. The ﬁrst involves requests for a formal meeting by
FDA regulated entities. The general goal requires that the FDA notify the requestor of a formal meeting
date within 14 days of the request. For FY99, the Act requires this for 70% of requests, for FY00 80%, and
FY01 90%. The PDUFA II (i.e. the 1997 reauthorization) also set goals for the amount of time between
the request and the date of the actual meeting. Depending on the type of meeting, it must occur within 30,
60, or 75 days from the date of the request. The reports do not indicate a sliding scale of achievement as in
other areas. It is unclear whether this means that the implicit goal was 100% compliance. Finally, Congress
41required the FDA to compile minutes for every meeting that clearly outline disagreements and issues for
further discussion. The FDA must complete the minutes within 30 calendar days of the meeting. Once again
there are no progressive percentage goals.
Generally, the FDA performed quite well. The percentage of responses to meeting requests within the 14-day
window ran well ahead of the stated goals. In FY99, 88% of meeting notiﬁcations were on time, this increased
to 90% in FY00, and 91% in FY01. The FDA was consistent in regards to scheduling meetings within the
time guidelines set by the act. In each ﬁscal year from 1999-2001, 87% of the meetings were scheduled
according to the congressionally ordered time frame. The FDA did not perform as well in achieving the
meeting minutes goals. Compliance fell from 83% in FY99, to 78% in F00, to 74% by FY01.
Table 6.5 Percentage of Meeting Management Targets Met (FY99-
01)
Requests Scheduling Minutes
42FY99 88% 87% 83%
FY00 90% 87% 78%
FY01 91% 87% 74%
The other procedural goals involve other aspects of the IND process. In the PDUFA reauthorization, Congress
asked the FDA to respond to a drug sponsor’s request for a clinical hold within 30 days of receipt. For years
1999-2001, Congress set the goal at 90% of requests responded to in this time frame. Congress also began
regulating the FDA’s response to a sponsor’s appeal of an agency decision. The Act requires the FDA to
respond to these ‘major dispute resolution’ issues within 30 days of receipt from the drug sponsor. The
target percentage of responses in this time moves from 70% in FY99, to 80% in FY00, to 90% in FY01.
Finally, the FDA must respond to a sponsor’s request to evaluate a clinical protocol within 45 days of such
a request. Percentage of compliance moves from 60% in FY99, to 70% in FY00, to 80% in FY01.
Table 6.6 shows that the FDA achieved most of the goals mentioned above. The percent of clinical hold
responses that occurred within the given time frame remained high. During FY99, 92% of responses occurred
on time. In FY00 this number increased to 94%, but in FY01 the number dropped slightly below target
to 89%. Appeal responses ran ahead of the outlined percentage goals. Seventy-one percent of responses
occurred on time in FY99, and in both FY00 and FY01, 100% of responses were completed with 30 days.
Finally, responses to requests for protocol design changes exceeded the required goals, with 97% of responses
occurring in a timely fashion during FY99 and FY00 and 83% on time during FY01.
43Table 6.6 Percentage of Meeting Management Targets Met (FY99-
01)
FY99 FY00 FY01
Clinical HoldGoal 90% 90% 90%Actual 92%
94% 89%Response to Appeals Goal 70% 80%
90%Actual 71% 100% 100% Response to Evalua-
tion Reqs. Goal 60% 70% 80%Actual 97%
97% 83%
Part V: Drug Lag Persists
By all internal measures the PDUFA was a spectacular success. The user fees generated millions of dollars,
the FDA hired hundreds of new employees, and review times have radically decreased in almost all categories.
Despite this, scholars continue to write articles about drug lag and empirical research suggests that major
problems with the American drug approval system remain. How is this possible? Unfortunately, the FDA and
Congress failed to address the entire set of issues that comprise the drug lag phenomenon. They conceived of
drug lag as a problem of slow and ineﬃcient review of NDAs. They believed that by expediting this process
drug approval times in America would begin to mirror those in Europe and Asia and the drug lag issue would
disappear. The FDA and Congress did not address the fact that drug lag also involves the time required for
clinical development and, at the most general level, the total amount of time and money required to guide
a drug through the entire process. The result has been a statute that accomplished many goals, yet has
enjoyed only limited success in reducing clinical development times and has miserably failed to prevent the
44time and money required to develop new medicines from skyrocketing. Congress did not design the PDUFA
to address these additional aspects of drug lag and therefore the statute cannot be the ultimate solution to
the problem.
A. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act illustrates the myopic vision of Congress when
it passed the statute. The drafters of the statute clearly felt that they were competently dealing with drug
lag. The legislative history shows representatives using words like “groundbreaking”121 and “historic.”122 In
the section entitled ‘Background and Need for the Legislation,’ the House report on the PDUFA states that
“the subject of drug lag has been studied by academic experts, commissions, Congressional committees, and
the Food and Drug administration.”123 It goes on to state that “the public interest is served by more rapid
approval of safe and eﬀective drugs” and that as a result of the bill “patients will have access to new drug
therapies much sooner.”124
The text of the statute is the ﬁrst evidence of Congressional failure to deal with all of drug lag’s aspects.
The section of the bill entitled ﬁndings states that:
Congress ﬁnds that (1) prompt approval of safe and eﬀective new drugs is critical to the improvement
of the public health so that patients may enjoy the beneﬁts provided by these therapies to treat and
prevent illness and disease; (2) the public health will be served by making additional funds available
for the purpose of augmenting the resources of the Food and Drug Administration that are devoted
to the process for review of human drug applications.125
Plainly, prompt approval of new drugs is important and the reduction of review time is a worthy goal.
However, these ﬁndings begin by discussing the tail end of the drug development process. If preserving the
public health requires prompt new drugs, then one must discuss the entire phase of drug development prior
121138 Cong. Rec. H9095 (1992) (daily ed. September 22, 1992) (statement by Rep. Waxman).
122138 Cong. Rec. H9099 (1992) (daily ed. September 22, 1992) (statement by Rep. Dingell).
123H.R. Rep. No. 102-895 (1992).
124Id.
45to NDA submission.
The comments of some individual representatives illustrated this curious failure to
even consider earlier stages of drug development. During a hearing, Senator Coats stated that “(i)t takes
roughly 12 years to bring a drug from infancy to market.”126 He accurately called this situation “disturb-
ing”127 and “extremely important.”128 In the same statement backing the PDUFA, Senator Coats mentions
that the bill is designed to reduce standard NDA review time by 8 months.129 There is no evidence that the
Senator realized that these two statements are in tension. If the true problem is the 12 year average, how
can an eight month reduction be a panacea. Certainly any amount of reduction is helpful. However, it is
illogical to propose a bill as a solution to expanding drug development times when that proposed solution
will only reduce times by a fraction of one year.
The legislative history also suggests that Congress never considered alternatives to a user fee system. The
debate seems to operate on the premise that the only avenue for reform is the initiation of user fees. A
statement by Congressman Waxman illustrates this point:
Mr. Speaker, we have been struggling for years in this country to ﬁnd a way to speed up the
process for the approval of breakthrough drugs. While many ideas have been proposed, in my view
there are only two approaches that can work. We could water down the safety or eﬃcacy standards
applicable to drugs, but that would unacceptably undermine the public health. Or we could get the
Food and Drug Administration more resources, but that has been almost impossible in recent years.
The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 is a groundbreaking bill because it will increase FDA
resources without using the traditional appropriations process. As a result, the public will beneﬁt
by getting access to lifesaving drugs sooner.130
126Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992: Hearing on H.R. 6181 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,




46Congressman Waxman fails to realize that, if the goal is getting drugs to consumers faster, other options are
available. The last section of this paper discusses several steps Congress and the FDA could take to streamline
the clinical phases and reduce persistent problems that delay drug development. The congressman’s comment
rests on an incorrect assumption that improvement of the NDA process is the only avenue of reform. Senator
Kennedy shared this ﬁxation on giving the FDA more resources to the exclusion of other potential remedies
for drug lag. While encouraging the bill’s passage, he argued that “(t)he need for the legislation is obvious.
The current federal budget situation oﬀers little prospect that adequate resources will be available to the
FDA to do the job it should be doing in the years ahead.”131 Certainly Senator Kennedy was correct that
the FDA needs enough resources to perform its job. But if its job is to ensure the safety and eﬃcacy of drugs
in the most eﬃcient manner possible, just giving the agency more money cannot be the entire solution.
Dr. David Kessler may bear some of the blame for Congress’ failure to consider alternatives to, or provisions
to coincide with, user fee legislation. Dr. Kessler was the Commissioner of the FDA in 1992 when Congress
initially passed the PDUFA. He testiﬁed at most of the hearings designed to investigate the user fee proposal.
His statements at diﬀerent hearings were generally quite similar and usually included a portion where he
stated that, “if we really want to go to the next step, if this Nation really wants to get new drugs reviewed and
on the market more quickly, the only answer is to provide more reviewers.”132 By the 1997 reauthorization,
the situation does not appear to have signiﬁcantly improved. The lead deputy commissioner told a committee
of congresspersons about the FDA’s many successes under the PDUFA.133 No one appears to have realized
that this commendable success left little room for continued improvement and made it even more critical
that additional measures be discussed and considered.
131138 Cong. Rec. S17234, 17238 (1992) (daily ed. October 7, 1992) (joint statement by Senators Kennedy and Hatch).
132Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992: Hearing on H.R. 6181 Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
102nd Cong. 4 (1992) (statement of Dr. David Kessler, Commissioner of Food and Drugs) (emphasis added).
133Reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act and FDA Reform: Hearing on H.R. 1411 Before the House Sub-
comm. on Health and Environment, 105th Cong. 14-17 (1997) (statement of Michael A. Friedman, Lead Deputy Commissioner
of Food and Drugs).
47B. Empirical Data
As one might expect, the failure to focus on the clinical phase of drug development has resulted in limited
progress in this area. This, in turn, has limited the PDUFA’s success in increasing the overall speed of drug
development. One of the ﬁrst people to address the clinical issue was Kenneth Kaitin in 1997. His report
focused on the development of new chemical entities (NCEs) during ﬁscal years 94-96. A NCE is “any new
molecular compound not previously approved in the United States, excluding vaccines, diagnostic agents,
and over the counter products.”134 To compile the data, researchers sent user fee surveys to pharmaceutical
and biotechnology companies during the years 1994-1996. Each year between 50 and 60 surveys were mailed
and response rates varied from approximately 40% in 1995 to 64% in 1994. The surveys asked the companies
about all of their user fee compounds currently under review at the FDA. They also inquired about the
type of applications that were pending and the dates on which various types of applications were ﬁled.135
Researchers supplemented survey data with data from the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development
(CSDD), the FDA annual reports to Congress, and information from public sources such as the Federal
Register.
The study did show that drugs subject to user fees navigated through the NDA process faster. Of the NCEs
included in the study, the ones subject to user fees obtained approval letters 53% faster than non-user fee
entities.136 The user fee NCEs averaged 14.5 months from submission of the NDA to approval letter while
the non-user fee NCEs averaged 31.0 months. This positive data was oﬀset however, by the realization that
134Kenneth I. Kaitin, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 and the New Drug Development Process, American
Journal of Therapeutics, 1997, at 168.
135Id.
136Id. at 169.
48much of the eﬃciency gain at the FDA was being lost during the IND phase. During the 94-96 period, the
average IND phase for user fee NCEs was 9% longer than for non-user fee NCEs. This made the overall
process of drug development only slightly shorter (102 months as opposed to 112.1 months) for user fee
drugs.137
A subsequent study performed by the Tufts CSDD suggested that some progress had been made.138 The
sample of NCEs examined in the study suggested that during 1997-1998 average clinical phases had dropped
by an impressive 17 months, from 81.4 months to 64.3 months.139 One should be wary of drawing large
conclusions from this, however. First, it is not clear if this drop in clinical phase time will become a trend. It
could be an anomalous result attributable to an unknown factor. Secondly, the number of NCEs reported for
the 97-98 period was considerably lower than for all other periods. The study included 90 NCEs during 94-96
and 105 during 1981-85.140 By contrast, the study measured only 42 NCEs during 97-98. If this represents a
reduction in the total number of NCEs reviewed by the FDA, the agency may have been more eﬃcient due to
a temporarily light workload. Thirdly, the second study found that clinical times for new biopharmaceuticals
continued to rise. During 1997-98, the average clinical phase was 62.7 months, the highest it had been since
1981.141
More recent information has conﬁrmed that clinical delays continue for various classes of drugs. In 2001,
the CSDD reported that while clinical times have fallen for AIDS antivirals, anti-infectives, respiratory, and
anti cancer drugs, they have risen for analgesics, endocrine, central nervous system142, and cardiovascular
137Id.
138Janice M. Reichert & Jennifer Chee, The Eﬀects of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act and the Food and Drug Modern-
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49drugs.143 The CSDD also maintains that biotechnology clinical development times have steadily increased
from 1982 to the present.144 To the extent that clinical development times are falling, it is not clear that the
PDUFA is the cause. Certainly, the procedural and meeting goals outlined in PDUFA II might be responsible.
However, it could also be the result of companies, in response to continually rising costs, becoming more
eﬃcient and dealing with the FDA more eﬀectively. In fact, research shows that the pharmaceutical industry
tripled expenditures on research and development during the 1990s, from $10 billion to $30 billion, and
industry executives have focused on fostering relationships with the FDA to facilitate drug development.145
Even if one were to assume that clinical times are truly falling on a long term basis, this still does not
authorize anyone to declare the death of drug lag. With drug development still requiring 10-15 years and
over $800 million there is still considerable room for improvement. 146
Some have argued that even on its own terms the PDUFA has had limited success. One of the primary goals
of the legislation was to improve FDA performance versus that of other countries. However, in March of
2000, eight years into the user fee experiment, a CSDD study found that FDA approval times of biotech drugs
were lagging behind those of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (“EMEA”).147 Average approval
time for the FDA was 452 days while the EMEA averaged 417 days. The gap for recombinant DNA products
was much larger with an average review time of 411 days in Europe and 548 days in the United States.148
143Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Outlook 2001, available at
http://csdd.tufts.edu/InfoServices/OutlookPDFs/Outlook2001.pdf.
144Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Outlook 2003, available at
http://csdd.tufts.edu/InfoServices/OutlookPDFs/Outlook2003.pdf.
145Id.
146Tufts, supra note 1.
147Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Impact Report: European Approval of New Biotech Drugs Outpaces US
Approval. March 2000, available at http://www.tufts.edu/med/research/csdd.
148Id.
50The FDA has vigorously defended its drug review performance in the face of these allegations. In 1996,
Commissioner Kessler wrote an article boldly claiming that “drug lag” did not exist. In the Journal of
the American Medical Association, Kessler used drug approval data from the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany, and Japan to argue that Americans were getting important, life-saving drugs as fast or
faster than people in comparable countries.149
Kessler looked at 214 drugs that came onto the world market between January 1990 and December 1994.
The drug approval agencies of the four nations were asked to provide a marketing approval date for any of
the 214 drugs that they had approved. “Information was supplied by the FDA in the United States, the
Medicines Control Agency in the United Kingdom, Bundesinstitut fur Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte
and the Paul-Ehrlich-Institut in Germany, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare in Japan.”150 For the
purposes of this study a NCE was considered a ‘new drug.’ The study generated two primary comparisons.
First, it compared the United States individually to each of the other three nations in the study. Secondly,
researchers examined the data to determine the order in which drugs received approval from the four nations.
In the ‘head to head’ competition with Great Britain, Kessler’s study found that the U.S. and U.K. had
both approved 58 of the 214 NCEs covered in the study. Of these, the U.S. was ﬁrst to approve 30, a
little over half. The average lead times favored the U.S. slightly as well; i.e. “the drugs approved ﬁrst in
the United States were approved an average of 17 months ahead of U.K. approval, while the 28 U.K.-ﬁrst
drugs were approved an average of 15.8 months ahead of U.S. approval.”151 The study showed that 29
products had been approved in the U.K. and not the U.S. and 18 products had been approved in the U.S.
and not the U.K. Kessler maintained that there was no signiﬁcant drug in the U.K.-only group that the FDA
considered important. “Two of the 29 U.K.-exclusive drugs were initially considered priority drugs by the
149David A. Kessler, Approval of New Drugs in the United States Comparison With the United Kingdom, Germany, and
Japan, Journal of the American Medical Association, December 11, 1996.
150Id.
151Id.
51FDA, but both were subsequently withdrawn from the worldwide market prior to U.S. approval primarily
for safety reasons.”152 Kessler considered the remaining U.K.-only drugs to be similar to drugs already on
the U.S. market. In contrast, he maintained that nine of the U.S.-only drugs were compounds that the FDA
considered ‘priority drugs.’ Among these was a HIV drug, a drug to treat Alzheimer’s disease, and a drug
to treat previously unresponsive forms of epilepsy.153
In the comparison with Germany, the study found that both countries had approved 44 out of the 214 drugs
measured. Of these, 31 were approved ﬁrst in the United States. Again, the U.S. had a better lead time with
the U.S.-ﬁrst drugs approved an average of 17.9 months earlier than German approval and the Germany-ﬁrst
drugs approved only 10.8 months prior to U.S. approval. Germany approved 34 drugs that the U.S. did not,
of which the FDA only considered one a priority. Kessler argued that the remaining 33 drugs had equivalents
on the U.S. market. Conversely, the FDA designated half of the 32 U.S.-only drugs as priority drugs.154
Finally, the comparison between Japan and the United States revealed similar results. Both countries had
approved only 14 drugs during the period covered by this study. Ten of them were approved ﬁrst by the
FDA. The U.S.-ﬁrst drugs were approved 22.4 months ahead of Japanese approval while the Japan-ﬁrst
drugs were approved an average of 18.5 months before U.S. approval. The U.S. only considered three of the
82 Japan-only compounds priority drugs. In contrast, 33 of the 62 U.S.-only drugs were FDA-designated
priority drugs. Among them are two anti-epileptic drugs, drugs for breast and ovarian cancer, and an AIDS
drug.155
The data Kessler cites also looks at how many of a country’s new drugs were ﬁrst approved in that country.
For example, of the 76 NCEs approved in the U.S. during the studied ﬁve year period, 45 (59%) received





52approved before any of the other three countries. Germany did poorly with only 20 (26%) of its 78 new
drugs approved before all of the other countries. Kessler disregarded the fact that Japan had approved 82%
of its new drugs ﬁrst since so many of the drugs Japan approved were not approved in any other country.156
While valiant, Kessler’s attempt to argue away the drug lag problem is not persuasive. Kessler stresses the
fact that Americans consistently have access to drugs that the FDA deems a priority. This doesn’t prove
very much, however. It makes sense that the FDA would approve drugs it considered important faster.
Research would probably reveal that every industrialized nation quickly approves the drugs that it considers
a priority. By focusing on these drugs Kessler eﬀectively “stacked the deck” in his favor. Dr. Joe DiMasi of
the Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug development responded to the study by saying that “(i)t
is only the FDA’s judgment that other drugs are not that important.”157
Even the drugs Kessler used for the study skewed the results. The time frame of the study “left out the
many drugs ﬁrst introduced in Europe in the late 80’s and then submitted for U.S. approval in the 90s, as
well as drugs still on hold here (the U.S.) from the 80s.”158 Again, this allowed the FDA to use a set of data
that it knew would contain favorable results. The study also frequently used median numbers rather than
mean (or average) calculations. Looking at merely the approval time that was in the middle of all drugs
allowed the FDA to hide particularly lengthy reviews. When one doesn’t compute the average, these long
reviews don’t aﬀect the median which allows the FDA to mask problems.
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures Association was not impressed by Kessler’s analysis either.
156Id.
157Julie DeFalco, The FDA vs. Reform, Investors Business Daily, June 7, 1996, available at
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53They maintained that the U.S., as of 1996, was still lagging well behind other industrialized nations in drug
development time. “(A)ccording to PHRMA’s ﬁgures, more than 60% of the drugs approved by the FDA
between 1980-1994 were products that had been marketed in other countries ﬁrst.”159 During 1994 alone,
two-thirds of new molecular entities approved by the FDA were previously available in foreign markets. In
some cases “Americans were decades late in gaining access to these medicines.”160
Finally, Kessler’s analysis does not discuss the overall length of drug development in the United States versus
the other three countries. Just because a drug made it to market in the U.S. before the U.K. does not mean
U.S. consumers are better oﬀ. That same drug may have been in the pipeline in the U.S. years prior to
its development in the U.K. Furthermore, Kessler’s preoccupation with comparisons with other countries
again highlights his and the FDA’s myopic vision in regards to drug lag. As previously argued, the ultimate
problem facing the drug approval regime is the length of time between ﬁrst development and the permitted
marketing of a drug. Even if every drug were marketed in the U.S. ﬁrst, there could still be situations where
important drugs were delayed for years due to needless testing. As a former head of the agency, Kessler’s
failure to recognize the complexity of the problem cripples the FDA’s ability to solve drug lag.
The drug AZT provides an excellent example of this issue. Scientists ﬁrst isolated the human immunod-
eﬁciency virus as the cause of AIDS in 1984.161 The National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the National
Institute of Health (NIH) asked private drug companies to make drugs available for testing to determine if
the retrovirus would respond to any of them. Drug companies submitted a variety of entities that they had
developed but not put on the market for various reasons (lack of observed eﬃcacy, limited market potential,
failure to obtain an approved NDA, etc.). Burroughs-Wellcome submitted azidothymidine (AZT), a drug
159Ken Rankin, Is Kessler Using a Stacked Deck in Apparent Drug-Lag Denial, Drug Store News, January 8 1996, at 9.
160Id.
161Griﬃn, supra note 87 at 387.
54that was developed in the 1960s as a possible anti-tumor agent but proved ineﬀective.162
Once the drug illustrated eﬃcacy in ﬁghting HIV, the FDA dramatically expedited the entire process. Re-
searchers recorded the ﬁrst positive test results in February 1985 and by September 1986 the completion of
Phase II trials was yielding signiﬁcant results. The FDA initiated a treatment IND and by March 1987 the
FDA approved the drug “only two and a half years after the...initial request for drugs.”163 Victims of the
AIDS epidemic needed new drugs quickly. While they certainly were concerned about drugs being approved
in foreign countries, the primary concern was with expediting drug development. In employing the PDUFA,
the FDA has forgotten this lesson. The agency has been overly concerned with comparisons with other
nations and forgotten that people simply want quick access to new drugs. If AZT had been approved ﬁrst in
the U.S. after eight years, that would have been very little consolation to the AIDS lobby and the thousands
of people who would have died during drug development.
162Id. at 388.
163Id.
55Part VI: Potential Solutions
A. Finding Clinical Patients
One of the ﬁrst things the FDA could do to reduce drug lag is to increase patient awareness of clinical
trials. For some time there has been a shortage of patients willing and able to participate in clinical trials.164
This slows the IND phase of drug development and delays ultimate marketing of a drug. Many patients
simply aren’t aware of the trials that are occurring. Robert Comis, the president of the Coalition of National
Cancer Cooperative Groups maintains that “clinical trials represent the very best care we have to oﬀer for
many cancer patients, yet many do not take advantage of the opportunity because of lack of awareness or
misconceptions of what a clinical trial really is.”165
A survey conducted by Harris Interactive suggested that Mr. Comis is correct. The survey polled 6,000
cancer patients and found that approximately 85% of them were unaware or unsure about their ability to
participate in clinical trials. Seventy-ﬁve percent of those surveyed said they would have been willing to
participate in a clinical trial had they known about one. The survey found that more than 80% of cancer
patients believe that clinical trials are either “essential” or “very important” and that “all new prescription
drugs or other new treatments should be tested on human beings in clinical trials before they are approved
for general use.”166 Of the 16% of survey respondents who were aware of clinical trials, three-quarters of
them were dissuaded from participating by various reasons. Roughly one third thought that the medical
care they would receive in a trial would be less eﬀective than standard care, another third was concerned
about the risks of receiving a placebo, and the remaining respondents cited concerns about being treated
164Susan J. Landers, Guide Addresses Questions on Clinical Trials, Health & Science, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick 02/hlsc0527.htm.
165Biomed Central, US FDA User Fees May Have Accelerated New Drug Development but a Recent Survey Suggests
Diﬃculties in Obtaining Volunteers for Human Clinical Trials Still Slow Progress. January 30, 2001, available at
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20010130/04/.
166Landers, supra note 164.
56like a “guinea pig” and insurance companies’ unwillingness to cover treatment costs.167
The lack of knowing and willing participants for clinical trials not only slows drug development, it also erodes
the eﬃcacy of the trials researchers conduct. The smaller the sample of the population that participates,
the lower the chance that doctors can accurately observe side eﬀects and levels of eﬃcacy. The bulk of
the population will be using these drugs even though they were only tested on a very small subset. One
manifestation of this problem has been the diﬃculty researchers have encountered in ensuring suﬃcient
participation by racial minorities and seniors. A study published in the New England Journal of Medicine
recorded how many persons over 65 participated in clinical cancer trials conducted by the Southwest Oncology
Group from 1993 to 1996.168 The study found that seniors were only 25% of all clinical patients despite
accounting for 63% of cancer cases nationwide. For breast cancer in particular, only 9% of clinical patients
were over 65 even though 49% of breast cancer victims nationwide are seniors. The study concluded that
“too many doctors...assume that older patients (will) not be able to tolerate or beneﬁt from many of the
most promising treatments under study” and that this could be “disastrous” in the future as the American
population continues to age. For racial minorities, the study found similar results. A recent trial of a new
breast cancer drug attracted so few African-American women that the results of the study could not be
conﬁdently applied to this group. This is because “African American women are known to have estrogen-
receptor-negative tumors more often than white women and to develop the disease at a younger age.”169
The FDA could attempt to alleviate this problem in several ways. Obviously, the FDA needs to do a better
job of informing disease victims about clinical trials. A relatively easy way would be to set up an internet
database on the FDA website, and other health sites like NCI and NIH, that would list clinical trials and their
location. The database could be searchable by disease and location to facilitate victims’ preferences. Patients
167Id.
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57also need to have more general information about clinical trials. Recently the American Association of Health
Plans released a pamphlet entitled “Should I enter a clinical trial.” The pamphlet includes information about
how to ﬁnd trials that need patients, the phases of a trial, the importance of informed consent, and the risks
of participating in a trial.170 More information like this should be available and given openly to victims
of diseases like cancer and AIDS. In addition, health organizations need to encourage doctors to tell their
patients about clinical trials, especially older and minority patients.
B. Privatization
A regulatory solution that many scholars have suggested is some level of privatization of FDA functions.
Privatization could take two forms. One would be a system in which the decisions of foreign drug review
bodies are given legal eﬀect in the United States. This option will be discussed later. The other option
would allow certain private for or not-for-proﬁt entities to take over much of the FDA’s reviewing function.
Many argue that this would lead to increased eﬃciency in the drug development process without sacriﬁcing
safety or eﬃcacy.
Dr. Henry I. Miller oﬀered one suggestion of this second kind of privatization.171 Dr. Miller proposes that
Congress give “drug certifying bodies” (“DCBs”) much of the day-to-day duties of the current FDA. A DCB
would be comprised of personnel similar to the type the FDA currently employs; doctors, pharmacologists,
biologists, etc., along with suﬃcient managerial staﬀ. The DCBs would undergo a stringent accreditation
170Landers, supra note 164.
171Miller, supra note 3 at 90-101.
58process by the FDA. This process could mirror the “agency’s current scrutiny of the qualiﬁcations of the
clinical investigators and institutions” that perform clinical studies or the “accreditation of third parties for
the review of medical devices” that is currently allowed.172
Miller proposes allowing the drug certifying bodies to oversee clinical testing of a drug and ultimately approve
a NDA at the conclusion of the process. The DCB would then submit a detailed report on the approved
new drug to the FDA. The FDA would then have ﬁnal say over whether or not the drug was approved.173
Miller envisions enough drug certifying bodies such that each one could be highly involved with each drug
under its supervision. The DCB would work with the sponsor from the time of drug development, through
initial testing, award the IND, and help the sponsor craft the appropriate testing that will ultimately lead
to NDA approval. The DCBs would be funded by user fees that would be governed by contracts between
the boards and the drug sponsors.174
The principle beneﬁt of this system would be to reduce the current incentives that slow the drug approval
process. Many argue that the FDA has a strong impulse to be extra-cautious when approving new drugs.
When the FDA reviews a drug there are four potential outcomes: 1) a drug that should get approved
receives approval, 2) a drug that should not get approved does not receive approval, 3) a drug that should
get approved does not receive approval, and 4) a drug that should not get approved does receive approval.




59Figure 1.1 Potential Outcomes of the FDA Review Process175
Drug is safe and Drug is unsafe or
eﬀective ineﬀective
FDA grants the NDA Correct decision Type II error
FDA denies the NDA Type I error Correct decision
Many scholars believe that the FDA would much rather commit a Type I error as opposed to a Type II error.
People may needlessly suﬀer because of a Type I error, but usually those victims are unaware that the FDA
unwisely denied approval to a promising new therapy. Type II errors become front page newspaper stories,
alarm the public, and subject the FDA to considerable criticism.176 Having multiple DCBs would create
competition between them to eﬃciently and eﬀectively get NDAs through to the FDA and drugs onto the
market. The incentive to avoid letting dangerous medicines on the market will surely remain, but it would
be tempered by competition and proﬁt motive.177
Miller also cites a host of other potential beneﬁts from his proposed new system. The early involvement
of the drug review boards would facilitate identiﬁcation and rectiﬁcation of problems that would otherwise
occur during and therefore hinder the IND phase. Miller argues that sponsors will not have to endure
“arbitrary, unexpected regulatory obstacles early in the clinical testing of a new product.”178 For example,
in the past the FDA has required single dose only Phase I studies, required that clinical studies begin with
inappropriately low doses, or even required that foreign trials be completed before U.S. trials can commence.
Elimination of these possibilities would expedite the entire IND process, an area where signiﬁcant gains are
175Ceccoli, supra note 2 at 44.
176Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant to Dance: Privatizing the FDA Review Process, 51 Food Drug L.J. 651, 655
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60still possible. The involvement of the DCBs would also allow the review of data during the clinical trials.
Essentially this would lead to a “rolling NDA” which would reduce the ultimate amount of time needed
to complete the process. Finally, the DCB can help a sponsor recognize as early as possible that a line of
research should be cancelled. This will avoid the sponsor wasting time and millions of research dollars.179
The other form of “privatization” often suggested involves the United States recognizing the decisions of
foreign drug monitoring agencies. This would alleviate pressure on the FDA and could produce competition
between the agencies that could lead to some of the beneﬁts discussed above. The European Medicines
Evaluation Agency (“EMEA”) provides an example of this sort of system. While it is still in its infancy and
has signiﬁcant hurdles to overcome, it oﬀers a concrete example of an alternative drug review structure.
The EMEA was established in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty and became active on the ﬁrst day of 1995.180
As the name suggests, the eighteen countries and approximately 370 million people of the European Union
(EU) are participating in the EMEA harmonization experiment.181 Under the system, three methods of
drug approval are available to drug sponsors. A company can submit an application directly to the EMEA
which then makes a decision within 300 days that is binding on all EU members.182 Second, a company can
apply to the drug regulatory agency of a speciﬁc country and then forward a copy of the application to the
other EU states. “If the drug application is approved by the ﬁrst nation, the other nations are required to
either recognize the new drug for sale within their borders or to ﬁle a formal objection for adjudication by
the EC.”183 Finally, a drug sponsor can submit a drug application for approval in one speciﬁc country and
make no attempt to obtain approval in additional countries.
The United States could join this experiment in a couple of diﬀerent ways. One proposal is that the FDA
treat EMEA approval as “substantial evidence” of drug eﬃcacy. The EMEA requires an eﬃcacy showing
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61that could probably satisfy the FDA’s standard.184 Congress could also construct a mutual recognition
agreement between the FDA and the EMEA. This process could work such that sponsors would submit drug
applications to both entities and once one approved the drug the other would have a certain amount of time
to concur or disagree. Finally, the most drastic measure would be for the U.S. to join the EMEA and give its
decisions the eﬀect of law in this country. While this does seem highly radical today, it may be the eventual
end-point of the recent movement toward international harmonization.
Certainly the EMEA solution is not perfect. There have been complications and disagreements between the
18 nations of the European Union. Adding the United States will only add to the potential for conﬂict. It
may be unwise for the U.S. to legally bind itself to the decision of every European nation. British performance
tends to be faster yet equally if not more safe for consumers.185 It is not clear, however, that the same would
hold for Portugal, Greece or Italy.186 Historically, the United States drug approval process has also been
thought of as the ‘gold standard.’ This undoubtedly gives U.S. industry and the American consumer some
measure of advantage in the world market. Joining or allying with the EMEA might give away this valuable
asset in return for a beneﬁt that will primarily accrue to foreign drug manufacturers.
C. The British System
Another possibility for U.S. reform is movement to a regime that closely mirrors the drug approval process
of the United Kingdom. Britain provides an interesting comparison point for the U.S. because the system, in
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62many ways, is quite similar to our own. Key diﬀerences exist, however, that could provide a useful example.
Since the system has similar goals as well, the American public might be amenable to the British drug
approval regime.
British laws concerning medicines date back to the Ordinances of Pepperers of Soper Lane passed in 1316.187
“This early ordinance forbade the mixing of diﬀerent quality wares and the subsequent adulteration of
such products.”188 For many of the subsequent centuries, British food and drug law mainly dealt with
adulteration. The ﬁrst law concerned with safety and eﬃcacy, the Therapeutic Substance Act, was passed
in 1925. The main purpose of the act was to control the quality and manufacture of biologicals, i.e. vaccines
serums, toxins, and antibiotics.189 The Medicines Act of 1968 governs the modern British drug approval
process.190 Agencies with various names have had the responsibility of reviewing drug applications under
this act. The current administrative actor is called the Medicines Control Agency (“MCA”).191 Formed in
1989 after an administrative reorganization, the MCA “currently operates as the sole statutory authority in
the U.K. holding the responsibility of overseeing the new drug approval process.”192
As previously mentioned, many aspects of the system would look familiar to a United States FDA employee.
Testing of drugs begins with animal trials and then proceeds through a serious of progressively larger clinical
trials. The British system mandates 1
2 year chronic toxicity studies in two species of animal for drugs that
are designed for long term use.193 A drug must demonstrate safety, eﬀectiveness, and quality before the
MCA grants the ‘product license’ that allows the marketing of a drug. The British also have a system
that mirrors the recent development of treatment INDs in America. Experimental drugs aren’t required to
navigate through the entire approval process before a doctor can prescribe them. This system turns out to
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63be somewhat more ﬂexible than the U.S. treatment IND system so more patients have access to cutting edge
drugs faster.194
Despite the similarities, three informative diﬀerences exist between the British and American systems. The
British system relies much more heavily on post-marketing data. Much of the inquiry concerning safety and
eﬀectiveness relies on data obtained from patients using the drug after it has been released onto the market.
The MCA oversees a “yellow card system” by which physicians record adverse drug reactions and report the
information back to the agency.195 Subsequent remedial steps include changing a drug’s information sheet,
issuing public warnings, or even rescinding the drug’s marketing license. This system allows consumers faster
access to drugs since some of the costly and time-consuming trials that the FDA requires can be avoided.
Secondly, the eﬃcacy standard has been interpreted diﬀerently in the two countries. The eﬃcacy standard in
the U.S. is formally codiﬁed, while in the U.K. there are no truly universal eﬃcacy standards.196 “(D)ecisions
on eﬃcacy in Great Britain are made on an individual, drug-by-drug basis.” This, coupled with a general
preference for post-marketing surveillance, leads the MCA to ﬁnd eﬃcacy sooner in the process than the
FDA would.197
Finally, the British system of reviewing new drug applications proceeds from what many call a “top down”
approach. When a drug sponsor submits a new drug application to the MCA, they are allowed to use
‘summary tables’ of data and include executive summaries of the value of the drug.198 The MCA does
not require that the drug company submit every ounce of data. The FDA takes the opposite, ‘bottoms
up’ approach. The sponsor of a NDA must submit almost all the raw data on the drug from the time of
ﬁrst development in the laboratory. This includes computer data tapes of case report forms, case report
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64tabulations, and narratives of clinical study reports.199 The fundamental diﬀerence is that American NDAs
are now tremendous in size compared to other nations like Britain. It is not uncommon for an NDA submitted
to the FDA to be 200,000 pages long and weigh over 5,000 pounds.200 While the FDA has certainly improved
the speed of NDA review, it probably could be even better if the FDA didn’t have so much paper to manage.
While one might assume that the ‘shortcuts’ the MCA takes would negatively aﬀect safety, there is little
evidence to substantiate this. The British system generally achieves similar safety results while allowing
consumers broader access to new medicines.201 A 1995 study compared the rates of drug withdrawals due
to safety in the U.S. and the U.K. The study found a 3% withdrawal rate in the United States and a 4%
rate in Britain.202 The study also found that American consumers were receiving access to a considerably
smaller number of drugs. Of the 104 new medicines in the study, 26.9% were approved only in the U.K. but
only 17.3% were approved only in the U.S.203
D. Eﬃcacy
Finally, a radical, yet likely eﬀective, regulatory change would be for Congress to completely eliminate the
eﬃcacy requirement. As discussed earlier, prior to the 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments the FDA did not
require proof of drug eﬀectiveness, just safety. Before the amendments, the agency was bound by a Supreme
Court decision that ruled that the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act did not give the FDA any authority
over assuring eﬃcacy.204 During the early 20th Century, randomized clinical trials had not been developed
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65anyway, so eﬃcacy testing was not a terribly productive enterprise to begin with. After the thalidomide
tragedy, the national mood shifted and people were much more willing to give the FDA considerable power.
Section 355(d) of the amended Food Drug and Cosmetic Act placed the burden on drug sponsors of gathering
scientiﬁc evidence to establish a new compound’s eﬀectiveness.205 The general rationale for the eﬀectiveness
standard was that people suﬀering from serious illnesses would injure themselves by using a new ineﬀec-
tive medicine rather than a previously approved eﬃcacious medicine. Many also reasoned that ineﬀective
remedies for minor conditions might displace older eﬀective drugs, essentially leaving the public without an
appropriate medicine on the market.206
The statutory standard the FDA uses is that a drug must show” substantial evidence” from “adequate and
well controlled investigations that a drug is eﬀective for its intended use.”207 To meet this standard, the
FDA almost always requires that at least two independent clinical trials substantiate a claim of eﬀectiveness.
“This so called ‘replication requirement’ embodies the scientiﬁc truism that positive ﬁndings from any single
study are credible only to the extent that they are conﬁrmed by subsequent research.”208
Despite the logic advanced by the FDA, many people have been quite critical of the onerous eﬃcacy re-
quirement. The replication and eﬀectiveness requirements generate contention between the FDA and drug
sponsors. Even large and very complicated clinical studies often do not meet the FDA’s standards for sta-
tistical and clinical signiﬁcance. Many critics have also maintained that the FDA applies the eﬀectiveness
requirement inconsistently. The FDA has occasionally approved drugs that treat diseases with signiﬁcant
and politically powerful victims after only one clinical trial. In addition, some allege that the FDA tends to
be less onerous when evaluating biologics, even when they are the functional and legal equivalent of drugs
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66produced in a lab.209 Most basically, the eﬃcacy requirement dramatically increases the amount of time and
money required to bring a product to market. Part II of this paper described the lengthy and complicated
procedure that the eﬃcacy requirement created. Consumers bear this cost in the form of higher drug prices
and delayed new medicines. The cost of assuring eﬃcacy is especially burdensome to small companies who
don’t have the cash ﬂow to fund two complicated and expensive studies.
This cost might be justiﬁable if the eﬃcacy requirement was logical, but it is not. For many people with
serious illnesses, treatments are unavailable or ineﬀective. These people do not beneﬁt from anything but
the briefest look into eﬃcacy. For those suﬀering from serious illnesses for which several courses of treatment
are available, using an ineﬀective new drug could cause harm. This danger is often overstated however.
People with serious, life threatening diseases are often under the close supervision of doctors who are experts
in the given disease. These expert doctors will have a good idea of whether a new drug might work for a
patient and will understand the risks of foregoing other treatment options. In a regime with limited or no
eﬃcacy testing, patients would not be left alone to treat their malignant tumors with ‘snake oil.’ Finally, the
danger from people taking ineﬀective drugs for minor ailments seems quite minimal. An ineﬀective product
probably could not displace an eﬀective one that enjoys established market share. Even if eﬀective over the
counter headache medicines could be driven oﬀ the market by an ineﬀective competitor, market conditions
would soon be ripe for an eﬀective compound to reappear. With an NDA already approved, the original
compound itself could make a relatively painless resurgence.
The prescribing practices of American doctors also make the eﬃcacy requirement largely irrelevant. When
the FDA evaluates a NDA it is looking for eﬃcacy in treating a certain speciﬁed condition. However, once this
threshold is met and the drug receives approval, a physician can prescribe the drug for any condition.210 This
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67phenomenon is known as oﬀ-label prescribing. An example of this is the antibiotic amoxicillin. This drug
was rigorously tested for eﬃcacy in treating respiratory tract infections. After it was approved, doctors and
scientists began attributing many stomach ulcers to bacterial infection. Antibiotics like amoxicillin became
very eﬀective ulcer treatments. Today, amoxicillin is a textbook treatment for stomach ulcers even though
it never was, and probably never will be, tested for this application. The commonly accepted standard of
treatment for many ailments now involves oﬀ-label use of FDA approved drugs.211 This state of aﬀairs
suggests that rigorous eﬃcacy testing for a stated use is largely irrelevant in many areas of medicine.
Part VII: Conclusion
The aim of this paper is not to portray the PDUFA as a complete failure. The user fees initiated by this
legislation have increased the speed and eﬃciency of the FDA review process. The annual reports to Congress
consistently show that the agency is meeting aggressive new goals year after year. Most importantly, the
average NDA review time has been more than cut in half, from 27.5 months to 12. The reduction in any
unnecessary delay in the drug approval process beneﬁts drug companies and consumers.
The true solution to drug lag is not contained in the PDUFA however. Clinical development times refuse
to fall in many areas. Average drug development time has continued to rise unchecked. Whether due to
lack of vision or lack of willingness Congress did not draft the PDUFA to eﬀectively deal with these issues.
The statute proceeds from a position that only post-NDA submission reforms can facilitate faster access to
new drugs. The FDA itself has been preoccupied with comparing its own performance with that of other
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68industrialized nations. Unfortunately, Americans will continue to die needlessly until Congress ﬁnds a way
to improve the IND phase of drug development.
The solutions proposed by this paper are certainly not perfect. Eﬀorts to ﬁnd more clinical participants
might help but it is not clear how much. Research did not reveal any concrete estimates of how much the
shortage of clinical patients slows drug development. Furthermore, a gigantic inﬂux of potential clinical
patients could create administrative problems that might hinder trials’ progress. Privatization is always a
contentious issue in American politics. The American people might not favor a measure to give private
entities the sort of power that the FDA possesses. The gains that might be achieved from DCBs are largely
speculative and the competition motive may prove insuﬃcient to counteract the incentive to commit Type
I errors. Many would argue that the American public has become too risk averse to move to a British-like
system of post marketing review or to accept a FDA without the power to assure eﬃcacy.
The fact that these solutions are not perfect does not matter however. What matters is that other options
exist that Congress should explore. Drug lag will continue until Congress and the FDA stop patting them-
selves on the back about the PDUFA’s successes and start thinking about its failures. Until this happens
signiﬁcant reduction in clinical development times or drug development costs will not occur.
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